A aplicabilidade do princípio in dubio pro societate na sentença de pronúncia do rito do Tribunal do Júri.

Abstract

The present monographic work deals with the "applicability of the principle in dubio pro societate in the sentence of pronounce in the rite of the Court of the Jury". For its elaboration it was used the critical and reflexive hermeneutic method, seeking to interpret and analyze, through bibliographical and jurisprudential research, the positioning about the subject. In this sense, it is necessary that, in order for the accused to be pronounced, the case being referred to the trial before the Court of the Jury, it is necessary that the judge be convinced of the existence of proof of the materiality of the fact and sufficient indications of authorship or participation. However, in some cases, the judge is faced with doubts about the existence of such requirements. In view of this hypothesis, the magistrate may choose between two alternatives: to apply the principle in dubio pro societate, pronouncing the accused and referring the trial before the jury court or to apply the principle in dubio pro reo, impronunciating the accused by virtue of the presumption of innocence. In this way, in order to resolve such a conflict, the understanding of doctrine and jurisprudence on the solution of the problem is analyzed, concluding that the application of the principle in dubio pro societate has no legal support in the Brazilian criminal procedure, violating the principle of presumption of innocence.