Imbricações do presidencialismo de coalizão no modelo democrático representativo desenhado na Constituição Brasileira de 1988.

Abstract

The theme of coalition presidentialism was inaugurated in Brazil by the political scientist Sérgio Abranches, who had already noticed this phenomenon in the context of the Constitution of 1946. The Brazilian institutional arrangement is therefore a political arrangement that includes the granting of privileges, granting the formation of a majority parliamentary bloc designed to ensure governability and political stability within the specific framework of the national multiparty system. As a problem that instigates the present research: what are the most common reflexes arising from the presidentialism of the Brazilian coalition and its impacts on the democratic model drawn in the Brazilian Constitution? In this context, the objective is to investigate the practices commonly resulting from the presidential presidency and its reflexes in the Brazilian democratic model and in the relationship between the Legislative and Executive branches. We want to demonstrate that coalition presidentialism affects the relationship between the powers, causing a great interference of the Legislative over the Executive, which can be seen with the frequent cases of impeachment occurred in Brazil. In addition, it is evident that in the search for governability, the practice of acts harmful to public morality, such as the exchange and distribution of positions and other favors, in order to obtain a parliamentary majority, create an environment incompatible with Republican values. In a sense, the fragility of the majority representative system for the choice of the head of the Executive is perceived, as well as the creation of an environment that is very vulnerable to corruption. The objective is not to offer criticism to the system, but to present the democratic model contemplated in the Brazilian constitutional text in order to get hold of the engineering that governs the relation between the powers and the representative system in force in the country. Finally, it will be demonstrated that this institutional arrangement satisfies a democratic demand in plural, unequal and fragmented societies, as well as requires a dialogue to achieve governability. However, the high cost of maintaining such a fragile and complex party alliance policy, in which the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative is highlighted, will be highlighted. For this, the research will be limited to the epistemological bases of the separation of powers, as well as of the systems of government, and, as a background, questions pertinent to the representative democratic model. The bibliographical and documentary techniques and the deductive method will be used.