A aplicabilidade do princípio in dubio pro societate como fundamento para a sentença de pronúncia.

Abstract

This monographic work deals with the applicability of the in dubio pro societate principle as a basis for the pronouncement sentence, analyzing its possible collisions with constitutional principles. The aim is to better understand the pronouncement decision, which is a judgment of admissibility where the judge assesses the probability of the accusation based on sufficient evidence of authorship and materiality of the crime, without requiring full proof. In this sense, the in dubio pro societate principle suggests that, in the presence of reasonable doubt, the judge must pronounce the defendant, referring the case to the Jury Court. This approach is debated regarding its compatibility with the principle of presumption of innocence. Thus, there are two sides: on the one hand, the applicability of in dubio pro societate as a basis for the pronouncement sentence. On the other, a possible offense to the principle of presumption of innocence. To this end, this work will follow the deductive research method, starting from the general analysis of the Jury Court institute, to arrive atspecific questions regarding the applicability of the in dubio pro societate principle. Furthermore, the research technique adopted is bibliographic, based on the survey of theoretical references on the topic. Bibliographical research in all branches of Law will provide a broad analysis of the matter, taking into account all legal controversies. Finally, through a critical analysis, we intend to offer a broad understanding of the complexities of in dubio pro societate, its advantages, concerns and implications in the criminal process and in the protection of the rights of the accused. The study aims atan in-depth analysis of judicial decisions in the first phase of the special Jury Court procedure, balancing the interests of society and the fundamental rights of individuals, contributing to a fairer and more effective legal system.